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ABSTRACT
A source of unpredictability is equivalent to a source of information: unpredictability
means not knowing which of a set of alternatives is the actual one; determining the actual
alternative yields information. The degree of unpredictability is neatly quantified by the
information measure introduced by Shannon. This perspective is applied to three kinds
of unpredictability in physics: the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics, the
unpredictability of the coarse-grained future due to classical chaos, and the unpredictability
of open systems. The incompatibility of the first two of these is the root of the difficulty
in defining quantum chaos, whereas the unpredictability of open systems, it is suggested,
can provide a unified characterization of chaos in classical and quantum dynamics.
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I. UNPREDICTABILITY AND INFORMATION
Unpredictability. To discuss it, we need a framework. What is it? How is it described,
and—if we intend a scientific discussion—how is it quantified? The goal in this introductory
section is to suggest a framework for discussing and describing unpredictability.
Suppose one is interested in a particular set of alternatives. Unpredictability for these
alternatives means simply that one can’t say reliably which alternative is the actual one.
Several examples provide reference points for the discussion.
• A horse race where a gambler bets on the winner. The relevant alternatives for
the gambler are the horses in the race.
• A game of frisbee golf played in a gusty wind. The alternatives of interest to a
participant are the possible paths of the frisbee—more precisely, histories of the
frisbee’s center-of-mass position and orientation as the frisbee is buffeted by the
wind.
• A New Mexico farmer growing chiles. The chiles are infested by a pest that can be
eliminated by applying a biological agent. The catch is that the agent is rendered
ineffective if it rains within a day of application, not an unlikely event during the
thunderstorm season of July and August. The relevant alternatives for the farmer
are whether or not it rains on a given day.
• A photon incident on a polarizing beam splitter. An experimenter, by adjusting
the orientation of the beam splitter, selects two orthogonal linear polarizations,
which are sent along different paths by the beam splitter. The alternatives of
interest to the experimenter are these two orthogonal linear polarizations.
In these examples, there is an element of unpredictability, an uncertainty as to which
alternative turns out to be the actual one. Though prediction is often thought of as having
to do with future behavior—our examples have this flavor—in this article we do not include
any temporal relationship in the notions of predictability and unpredictability. The key
element in unpredictability is uncertainty about the actual alternative among a collection
of alternatives. There can be uncertainty about past as well as future events. For example,
the horse race might have been run last night; not knowing the outcome, two friends could
bet on the winner today, facing the same uncertainty about the outcome as they would
have encountered before the race.
How is unpredictability described mathematically? By assigning probabilities to the
alternatives. At the horse race the bettor assigns probabilities based on what he knows
about the horses. These probabilities are betting odds: if the bettor assigns a probability
1/n for a horse to win, it means that he is willing to place a bet on that horse at odds of n
to 1 or better. The frisbee golfer, applying his experience to the present condition of the
wind, assigns probabilities intuitively to various possible histories of the frisbee’s motion.
The New Mexico farmer can assign a probability for rain based on his own experience and
observations or, perhaps better, obtain a probability for rain from the National Weather
Service or from private weather-forecasting concerns. The experimenter with the polarizing
beam splitter assigns probabilities to the two linear polarizations based on what he knows
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about the photon. Suppose, for example, that the beam splitter is oriented at 45◦ to the
vertical; the two output paths then correspond to linear polarizations at 45◦ and 135◦ to
the vertical. If the experimenter knows that the photon is vertically polarized, then the
rules of quantum mechanics dictate that he assign equal probabilities to the two output
polarizations.
These probabilities are Bayesian probabilities.1–4 Bayesian probabilities apply to a sin-
gle realization of the alternatives, as is evident in the examples. They are subjective in that
their values depend on what one knows. Sometimes, as in the case of quantum mechanics,
there are explicit rules for converting one’s knowledge into a probability assignment; in
other cases, the values of the probabilities represent little more than hunches.
Reliable prediction requires probabilities that are close to 0 or 1. If probabilities for
a single realization are not close to 0 or 1, it is still possible to make reliable predictions,
if one has available a large ensemble of independent, identical realizations, all described
by the same probabilities. In such a large ensemble, the frequencies of occurrence of the
various alternatives can be predicted reliably to be close to the probabilities. Indeed, this
is the reason that ensembles are used—to convert unpredictability for a single realization
into reliable predictions for frequencies within a large ensemble of independent, identically
distributed realizations.
Because the scientific enterprise requires precise predictions, scientific experiments
often use a large ensemble of independent, identically distributed realizations. Sometimes,
as in the case of the photon, such an ensemble is cheap, making it easy to perform precise
experimental tests of probability assignments. In other cases, as in clinical trials of new
drugs, it is difficult to assemble an appropriate ensemble, the large cost being justified
only by the need for a precise test. Because of the importance of ensembles in scientific
experiments, scientists are vulnerable to the notion that probabilities have meaning only
as frequencies in a large ensemble.5 Yet probabilities for a single realization are used
routinely in rational decision making. The example of the horse race shows this: the
bettor determines his strategy for a single race from the probabilities that he assigns to
that race.
The most misunderstood aspect of Bayesian probability theory is the relation between
the probabilities for a single realization and frequencies within an ensemble of realiza-
tions. Because this relation is so important, yet so often misunderstood, it deserves a
brief digression here. An ensemble has a bigger space of alternatives than does a single
realization. The probabilities on this larger space do not follow from the probabilities
assigned to individual realizations within the ensemble. Assigning probabilities to the en-
semble alternatives involves considerations beyond those needed to assign probabilities to
individual realizations.4,6 In particular, if there are correlations among the members of
the ensemble, the probabilities assigned to the ensemble should reflect these correlations.
When there are correlations, the probabilities for an individual realization generally do not
predict frequencies within the ensemble. A simple example is that of a biased coin, the
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bias known exactly except for its sign, which is unknown. The single-realization probabil-
ities for heads and tails, which are clearly equal, do not predict the many-toss frequencies.
The lesson here is that Bayesian probabilities for individual realizations do not necessarily
predict frequencies within an ensemble of realizations.
There are special cases, however, for which the probabilities for individual realizations
do predict reliably the frequencies within an ensemble. One of these special cases is the
case of a large ensemble of independent, identically distributed realizations. This suc-
cessful prediction of frequencies, important though it is, should not lead to the erroneous
conclusion that probabilities are equivalent to frequencies within a large ensemble. Rela-
tions between probabilities and frequencies cannot be posited; they must be derived from
probability theory itself.
The New Mexico farmer illustrates more generally how probabilities for a single realiza-
tion enter into rational decision making, providing a simple example of decision theory.7,8
For simplicity, assume that to be effective the biological agent must be applied on a par-
ticular day during the development of the pest. The Weather Service provides the farmer
probabilities pR, for rain that day, and pR/ = 1 − pR, for no rain. If the farmer decides
that it is not going to rain, he buys the biological agent and applies it to his chiles; if he
decides that it is going to rain, he doesn’t. Yet how is the farmer to decide? Though the
probabilities describe completely his uncertainty, he can’t make a decision on the basis of
the probabilities alone. In addition to the probabilities, he must consider the costs of his
actions. Given the costs, he can use the probabilities to make a rational decision.
Suppose that the pest, if left unchecked, reduces the value of the crop by a dollars, and
suppose that to buy and apply the biological agent costs b dollars. If the farmer doesn’t
buy the agent, then, rain or shine, his cost is the a dollars for a damaged crop. If the
farmer buys and applies the agent, his cost is a + b dollars if it rains and b dollars if it
doesn’t; the average cost of buying and applying the agent is thus (a+b)pR+bpR/ = apR+b.
The farmer should take the action that has lower average cost. Hence, he should buy and
apply the agent if apR + b < a or, equivalently, if pR/ > b/a. The costs determine how
confident the farmer should be that it will not rain before it is prudent for him to buy and
apply the biological agent.
Reliable prediction corresponds to probabilities near 0 or 1; other probability distribu-
tions describe varying degrees of unpredictability. How can the degree of unpredictability
be quantified? A natural measure comes from information theory. The information missing
toward specification of the actual alternative is given by the Shannon information9–11
H = −
∑
j
pj log2 pj , (1)
where pj is the probability for alternative j (the use of base-2 logarithms means that
information is measured in bits). An alternative that has unit probability can be predicted
definitely to occur; in this case there is no missing information, i.e., H = 0. At the other
extreme, if the alternatives are equally likely, then the situation is maximally unpredictable;
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the missing information is maximal, with value H = log2 J bits, where J is the number of
alternatives. This is the case, for example, when the vertically polarized photon is incident
on the beam splitter oriented at 45◦; the equal probabilities for the two output paths
correspond to 1 bit of missing information. For probability distributions between the two
extremes, the Shannon information takes on intermediate values.
One can acquire the missing information by observing which alternative is the actual
one. Wait for the finish of the horse race, and see which horse wins. Observe the frisbee
to see which path it takes. Wait to see it if rains. Wait for the photon to pass through the
polarizing beam splitter, and determine which direction it goes. This sort of observation
is, of course, not prediction. It is worth stressing that the reason it is not prediction is
not the element of “waiting” in our examples; the reason is that the missing information
is acquired by observing the alternatives themselves.
In contrast to observing the alternatives, it is often the case that uncertainty about
the actual alternative can be reduced or even eliminated entirely by gathering information
about factors that influence the alternatives or determine the actual alternative. For exam-
ple, the frisbee golfer, by combining detailed observations of the wind velocity immediately
upstream (initial conditions) with a model of the local terrain (boundary conditions), could
integrate the coupled equations for the wind and the frisbee’s motion, thus allowing him to
predict with certainty the frisbee’s path. The New Mexico farmer might persuade the Na-
tional Weather Service to gather sufficiently fine-grained meteorological data (initial and
boundary conditions) so that it could integrate the hydrodynamic equations for the atmo-
sphere, thereby predicting thunderstorms a day in advance. In the spirit of these examples,
it is tempting to posit in general an independent record of the missing information, outside
the realization of interest, an “archive” that records the actual alternative. The archive
stores the missing information in an encoded form, which must be decoded through, for
example, integration of an appropriate partial differential equation. Nonetheless, if one
has access to the archive and can decode the information stored there, predictability can
be restored.
It is useful to compare this description of unpredictability with that of a noiseless
communication channel.9–11 A transmitter prepares one of several alternative messages
and sends it down a channel to a receiver, which reads the message. How much information
is communicated from transmitter to receiver? The transmitter prepares the alternative
messages with various probabilities. The receiver is unable to predict which message it
will receive and thus acquires, on average, an amount of information given by the Shannon
information constructed from the message probabilities. The transmitter retains a record of
which message it sent, perhaps in an encoded form; by consulting the transmitter directly,
one can eliminate the uncertainty about which message is sent down the channel.
The archive where a record of the actual alternative is stored is like a transmitter: it is
a source both of unpredictability and of information. Indeed, the lesson is that a source of
unpredictability is the same as a source of information. By gaining access to the archive,
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one can acquire the missing information about which alternative is the actual one, thereby
restoring predictability.
In the examples of frisbee golf and the New Mexico farmer, the missing information is
available in the initial conditions and boundary conditions that determine a unique solution
to a set of differential equations. In the horse-race example, the bettor can improve his
prediction by gathering data about the previous performances of the horses and about
specific conditions on the race day. We don’t know if the remaining unpredictability can
be eliminated by gathering yet more information, because our understanding of the factors
that enter into determining the winner of a horse race is incomplete. To be more precise, we
don’t know whether there is a mathematical model that specifies what information needs
to be collected and how that information is to be decoded so as to predict the winner with
something approaching certainty. Because we have no complete mathematical model of
a horse race, we place its unpredictability, for the present, outside the scope of scientific
inquiry.
The case of the photon is the most interesting. Within quantum mechanics there
is no archive that can be consulted to determine the photon’s path through the beam
splitter, no identifiable transmitter of the bit of information that specifies the photon’s
linear polarization. The bit pops into existence out of nowhere. Yet, unlike the horse
race, where there is no complete mathematical model, quantum mechanics is thought to
be a complete theory, which provides the framework for all fundamental physical law,
a framework in which the probabilities are intrinsic. Quantum-mechanical probabilities
cannot be eliminated by gathering more information about the photon’s state, for to say
that the photon is vertically polarized is already a maximal quantum description of its
state.
We are in a position now to characterize how fundamental a source of unpredicta-
bility is. It seems sensible to say that the more difficult it is to consult the archive and
acquire the missing information necessary for predictability, the more fundamental is the
unpredictability. In this regard quantum unpredictability is in a class by itself: there is no
archive that stores an independent record of the information that is acquired in a quan-
tum measurement. Quantum unpredictability is a consequence of information without a
source; it cannot be eliminated by consulting an archive because there is no archive. Un-
predictability without an information source is so fundamental that we reserve for it the
appellation absolute unpredictability.
In the case of the New Mexico thunderstorm, the missing information is available as
initial data, but it is is very difficult to obtain because of the phenomenon of classical chaos,
which means that the coarse-grained past does not predict the coarse-grained future. To
predict a phenomenon on the coarse-grained scale of a thunderstorm requires initial data
on a much finer scale—indeed, a scale that is exponentially finer in the time over which
one desires a reliable prediction.
Although the data required to predict the coarse-grained dynamics of a chaotic system
are very difficult to obtain, that they are obtainable in principle cautions that care should
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be exercised in characterizing the difficulty of the task. In the spirit of decision theory,
what ought to be done is to compare costs: the cost of consulting the archive, obtaining the
missing information, and thereby eliminating the unpredictability should be compared with
the cost of not having the missing information and thereby having to deal with the resulting
unpredictability. If the cost of obtaining the missing information exceeds the benefit of
having it, we can point to a fundamental reason for “allowing” the unpredictability. Indeed,
a direct comparison of costs is the only way we know of to quantify how fundamental a
source of unpredictability is. We refer to unpredictability for which the cost of obtaining the
missing information far exceeds the benefit of having it as strong unpredictability. Having
introduced the notions of absolute unpredictability and strong unpredictability, we can
continue to use—and encourage others to use—the phrase “fundamental unpredictability”
in any other fashion desired.
We develop these ideas in the next section, with a discussion of three sources of un-
predictability in physics: the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics, the unpre-
dictability of the coarse-grained future of a classically chaotic Hamiltonian system, and
unpredictability that arises when a physical system is coupled to a perturbing environ-
ment. Our main interest is how these three kinds of unpredictability are related to chaos
in classical and quantum dynamics. The first two sources of unpredictability have already
been discussed; their incompatibility lies at the heart of the difficulty in formulating a
description of chaos in quantum dynamics. A further difficulty is that the unpredictability
of the coarse-grained future of a chaotic system does not lend itself to a meaningful com-
parison of the costs and benefits of obtaining the missing information. The third kind of
unpredictability, due to environmental perturbation, can be used to put chaos in classical
and quantum dynamics on the same footing, as we show in the last section of the article.
In particular, we describe a new characterization of classical chaos in terms of sensitiv-
ity to environmental perturbation, a characterization in which costs and benefits can be
compared directly, with classical chaos emerging as a strong source of unpredictability.
We indicate briefly how this same way of characterizing chaos can be applied to quantum
dynamics.
II. SOURCES OF UNPREDICTABILITY IN PHYSICS
In this section we focus on scientific unpredictability, specifically, unpredictability in
physics. One doesn’t have to look far to find such unpredictability; we need only look for
any place where physicists employ a probabilistic description.
The obvious place to look is quantum mechanics, which in our present understanding
provides the framework in which fundamental physical laws are formulated. In a quantum-
mechanical description, even if one has maximal information about a physical system,
i.e., knows its quantum state exactly, one nonetheless cannot predict the results of most
measurements. We can extend the photon example to provide a vivid illustration of this.
Suppose that the photon, initially polarized along the vertical axis, is incident on a series
of polarizing beam splitters whose orientations alternate between 45◦ and vertical. At
– 6 –
each beam splitter there is a bit of missing information about which direction the photon
goes. It appears that the photon is an inexhaustible source of information, yet within the
conventional formulation of quantum mechanics, there is no source for this information, no
archive that can be consulted to predict which path the photon will take through the series
of beam splitters. This is what we have designated an absolute source of unpredictability.
One might expect the entire discussion in this Workshop to be focused on the absolute
unpredictability of quantum mechanics. That it isn’t requires explanation, and we can
suggest two reasons. The first is that an alternative theory in which there is an identifiable
source for the missing information has serious drawbacks, a fact made evident by 30 years of
work on Bell inequalities.12 The desire for a source for the missing information—a quantum
archive—is strong. From the early days of quantum mechanics, many physicists have found
it unreasonable to have intrinsic unpredictability—unpredictability without a source of
information—and they have posited the existence of “hidden variables” that constitute
a quantum archive.12,13 The hidden variables, though they are presently and perhaps
permanently inaccessible, would provide enough information, could they be consulted, to
eliminate quantum unpredictability.
The catch is the following: the Bell inequalities show that if a hidden-variable the-
ory is to agree with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics—and, as experi-
ments show, if it is to agree with observation—the hidden variables must be nonlocal.
The archive cannot have independent subarchives for different subsystems (for example, a
subarchive within the apparatus that observes each subsystem), but rather must be one
enormous record that commands and correlates the behavior of everything in the Uni-
verse.[1] The necessity for hidden-variable theories to be nonlocal makes them considerably
less attractive—depending on one’s taste, even less attractive than the absolute unpre-
dictability of quantum mechanics. Yet if it turns out that the fundamental constituents
of matter exist in more dimensions than the four of our familiar spacetime, as in string
theory, then locality within four-dimensional spacetime might lose much of the force we
presently attach to it.
The second reason, mentioned in Hartle’s introductory lecture at this Workshop, is
this: the present Universe is enormously complex, its particularities describable only by
a great deal of information; if the fundamental physical laws and the initial conditions
are simple, where does all that information come from? In a hidden-variable theory, the
complexity of the present Universe is a revelation of the details of the hidden variables;
because the hidden variables can be thought of as part of the initial conditions, the initial
conditions necessarily become complex. It is somehow more appealing to imagine that the
laws and initial conditions are simple and that there is no archive in which is written an
independent record of the complexity of the present Universe; quantum mechanics obliges
[1] This conclusion about the nonlocality of a hidden-variable archive is true even if the
archive is forever inaccessible. Indeed, the notion of a nonlocal archive is perhaps easier
to swallow if it is inaccessible.
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by making the complexity almost wholly a consequence of the unpredictability of quantum
rolls of the dice.
What about unpredictability in classical physics? Nonlinear classical systems—here
restricted to Hamiltonian systems—can display a kind of unpredictability that comes from
classical chaos.14 Classical chaos is usually characterized in terms of the unpredictability of
phase-space trajectories. Consider the points along a phase-space trajectory at a discrete
sequence of uniformly spaced times. The points are never given to infinite precision; any
finite precision corresponds to a gridding of phase space into coarse-grained cells. The
sequence of finite-precision points, coarse grained both on phase space and in time, is
what is meant by a coarse-grained trajectory. For a classically chaotic system, coarse-
grained initial data do not predict a unique coarse-grained trajectory; more precisely, to
predict a unique coarse-grained trajectory requires initial data that become exponentially
finer in the time over which the prediction is desired.
It is instructive to review the mathematical formulation of classical chaos in which the
initial data appear explicitly as a source of unpredictability and information. Consider a
classical system whose motion is restricted to a compact phase-space region, represented
as a square in Figure 1. Grid this phase space into coarse-grained cells of uniform volume
V. The coarse-grained initial data (at time t = 0) are that the initial phase-space point
lies somewhere within a particular coarse-grained cell. This corresponds to a phase-space
density that is uniform on the initial cell. Under a chaotic Hamiltonian evolution, the
phase-space density spreads across phase space, creating a pattern of uniform density (see
Figure 1), which occupies the same volume as the initial cell and which develops structure
on finer and finer scales as the evolution proceeds.
At each of the discrete times t, the evolved pattern can be partitioned into all its
separate intersections with the initial grid. Each piece of the partition corresponds to
at least one coarse-grained trajectory that issues from the initial cell and terminates in
that piece at time t. It turns out that we introduce no error into the present discussion
by pretending that each piece of the partition corresponds to a unique coarse-grained
trajectory. Label the various pieces by an index j, and let Vj be the phase-space volume of
the jth piece. The probability for the corresponding coarse-grained trajectory is qj = Vj/V,
the fraction of the original phase-space volume occupied by the jth piece. The information
needed to specify a particular coarse-grained trajectory out to time t is given by the
Shannon information constructed from the probabilities qj . For a chaotic evolution, in the
limit of large t, this information grows linearly in time:
−
∑
j
qj log2 qj ∼ Kt . (2)
The linear rate of information increase, K, called the Kolmogorov-Sinai (KS) or metric
entropy,15 quantifies the degree of classical chaos.[2]
[2] The definition of KS entropy given here is not quite right, because K can depend on
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The information (2) is missing information about which is the actual coarse-grained
trajectory. The missing information can be obtained from the actual initial condition. The
correspondence can be made explicit in the following way. The jth piece of the partition of
the evolved pattern corresponds to a region of volume Vj within the initial cell; this region,
which has probability qj , is the region of initial conditions that lead to the coarse-grained
trajectory that terminates in the jth piece of the partition. Thus at each time t the initial
cell is partitioned into initial-condition regions, each of which gives rise to a particular
coarse-grained trajectory out to time t.
Imagine gridding the initial cell into very fine cells of uniform volume ∆v, cells so
fine that they are much finer than the initial-condition regions for all times of interest.
The information needed to specify a particular fine-grained cell within the initial coarse-
grained cell—this is the entropy of the initial phase-space density—is log2(V/∆v). This
information, when written as
log2
V
∆v
= −
∑
j
qj log2 qj +
∑
j
qj log2
Vj
∆v
, (3)
illustrates how the initial data act as an archive for the coarse-grained trajectory. The first
term on the right is the information needed to specify the initial-condition region for a
particular coarse-grained trajectory. The second term is the further information needed to
specify a fine-grained cell within an initial-condition region. The total information needed
to specify a fine-grained cell is the sum of these two terms. As a chaotic evolution proceeds,
more and more of the information needed to specify a fine-grained initial cell is required
to predict a particular coarse-grained trajectory.
A crude, but instructive picture of what is happening is that the number of pieces in the
partition of the evolved pattern grows as 2Kt, each piece having roughly the same phase-
space volume and, hence, the same probability qj = 2
−Kt. As the evolution proceeds,
the corresponding partition of the initial cell becomes exponentially finer, consisting of
roughly 2Kt initial-condition regions, and the information needed to specify a particular
region grows linearly in time. A coarse-grained trajectory can be regarded as a progressive
unveiling of finer and finer details of the actual initial data within the initial coarse-grained
cell.
How fundamental is the chaotic unpredictability of coarse-grained trajectories? It’s
not absolute unpredictability, as in quantum mechanics, because it is easy to identify
the source of information that must be consulted to eliminate the unpredictability. The
unpredictability of a coarse-grained trajectory is due wholly to a lack of knowledge of the
initial conditions. The source of information is thus the initial conditions, which when
the choice of initial cell. The quantity that grows asymptotically as Kt is really the average
of the information on the left side of Eq. (2) over all initial cells. We ignore this distinction
here, thereby assuming implicitly that the chaotic system has roughly constant Lyapunov
exponents over the accessible region of phase space.
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decoded through the equations of motion, yield a unique prediction for the coarse-grained
trajectory. Of course, if the required initial data are so fine that they are at the quantum
level on phase space, then the unpredictability of the coarse-grained trajectory becomes
sensitive to the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics. Classical chaos then
serves as an amplifier of quantum unpredictability to a classical level.16
Suppose we wish to assess how fundamental is the unpredictability of a chaotic coarse-
grained trajectory. Since the initial data are a source for the missing information needed
to predict a coarse-grained trajectory, we ought to compare the cost of obtaining the
necessary initial data with the cost of the unpredictability that comes from not having the
required data. Here a problem arises: it is difficult to formulate this comparison in a way
that is intrinsic to the system under consideration, because the costs generally depend on
factors external to the system. Take the New Mexico farmer as an example. The cost of
acquiring the required initial data depends on the level of technology used in gathering
the meteorological data. Worse, the cost of unpredictability is highly dependent on who
assesses the cost. It may be important to the farmer to know whether it will rain, but
the one of us who lives in Albuquerque generally doesn’t care much whether there is a
thunderstorm on a particular summer day. When he does care, a ten-minute warning,
easily obtained by looking out the window, is generally sufficient.
Classical physics has none of the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics.
Does quantum mechanics have any of the sensitivity to initial conditions that is displayed
by classically chaotic systems? There is no sensitivity to initial conditions in the evolution
of the quantum state vector: the unitarity of quantum evolution implies that it preserves
inner products, so the “distance” between state vectors remains unchanged during quan-
tum evolution. Suppose one looks for sensitivity to initial conditions in the “coarse-grained
trajectory” of some observable like position or momentum. Such a coarse-grained quan-
tum trajectory is constructed by periodically making coarse-grained measurements of the
observable. The problem is that the measurements generally introduce the absolute un-
predictability of quantum mechanics, making the coarse-grained trajectory unpredictable
for reasons that are essentially independent of the quantum dynamics. One ends up study-
ing not any sort of sensitivity to initial conditions in quantum dynamics, but rather the
absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics.
The incompatibility of the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics with the
classical unpredictability due to sensitivity to initial conditions is the chief difficulty in
formulating a description of quantum chaos. What is needed is a description of chaos that,
avoiding the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics and the classical sensitivity
to initial conditions, is formulated in terms of a form of unpredictability that is common
to classical and quantum physics. Notice, in particular, that instead of trying first to
formulate a description of quantum chaos, the primary task is to reformulate the description
of classical chaos, albeit in a way that is equivalent to the standard characterization in terms
of the unpredictability of coarse-grained trajectories. We have suggested and investigated
such a new way to characterize chaos, which we introduce here by considering yet a third
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source of unpredictability, the unpredictability of an open system, i.e., a system that is
coupled to a perturbing environment.17–22
In investigating this third source of unpredictability, an essential tool is the entropy
of a physical system. We introduce the notion of entropy, in both classical and quantum
physics, as the missing information about the system’s fine-grained state.23,24 For a classical
system, suppose that phase space is gridded into very fine-grained cells of uniform volume
∆v, labeled by an index j. If one doesn’t know which cell the system occupies, one assigns
probabilities pj to the various cells; equivalently, in the limit of infinitesimal cells, one can
use a phase-space density ρ(Xj) = pj/∆v. The classical entropy (measured in bits),
H = −
∑
j
pj log2 pj = −
∫
dX ρ(X) log2
(
ρ(X)∆v
)
, (4)
is the missing information about which fine-grained cell the system occupies. For example,
throughout this article we use as initial data a phase-space density that is uniform on
a coarse-grained cell of volume V; the corresponding entropy is log2(V/∆v). In quantum
mechanics the fine-grained alternatives are normalized state vectors in Hilbert space. From
a set of probabilities for various state vectors, one can construct a density operator
ρˆ =
∑
j
λj |ψj〉〈ψj| , (5)
where the state vectors |ψj〉 are the eigenvectors of ρˆ, with eigenvalues λj . The normaliza-
tion of the density operator, tr(ρˆ) = 1, implies that the eigenvalues make up a normalized
probability distribution. The von Neumann entropy of ρˆ (measured in bits),
H = −tr(ρˆ log2 ρˆ) = −
∑
j
λj log2 λj , (6)
can be thought of as the missing information about which eigenvector the system is in.
Entropy quantifies the degree of unpredictability about the system’s fine-grained state.
What makes it such an important quantity is that there is a readily identifiable cost,
intrinsic to the system, for the inability to predict the system’s fine-grained state. Suppose
that the system exists in the presence of a heat reservoir at temperature T , so that all
exchanges of energy with the system that are not in the form of useful work must ultimately
be exchanged with the reservoir as heat. Then each bit of entropy reduces the useful work
that can be extracted from the system by kBT ln 2, where kB is the Boltzmann constant.
(The factor kB ln 2 is a change of units; it translates entropy from bits to conventional
thermodynamic units.) The cost of missing information is a reduction in the useful work
that can be extracted from the system.
Entropy remains unchanged under Hamiltonian dynamical evolution, both classically
and quantum mechanically. Classically this follows from the preservation of phase-space
volume under Hamiltonian evolution; quantum mechanically it follows from the unitarity
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of Hamiltonian evolution, which preserves the eigenvalues of the density operator. Sup-
pose, however, that the system is coupled to a perturbing environment. The interaction
disturbs the system’s evolution; averaging over the disturbance generally causes the sys-
tem’s entropy to increase. This is a standard mechanism for entropy increase, the increase
quantifying the decreasing ability to predict the fine-grained state of the system. In this
case it is obvious that the source of unpredictability—the source of information—is the
perturbing environment. By observing the environment, one can determine aspects of the
perturbation, thus reducing the entropy increase of the system and rendering the fine-
grained state of the system more predictable.
The rub is that the information acquired by observing the environment has a ther-
modynamic cost, too, a cost paid when the information is erased. For erasure into a
heat reservoir at temperature T , this Landauer erasure cost25,26 is kBT ln 2 per bit, ex-
actly the same as the cost of missing information. The Landauer erasure cost exorcises
Maxwell demons.27–30 A demon observes a system directly, thereby decreasing the sys-
tem’s entropy—according to the demon, the system’s fine-grained state becomes more
predictable—and increasing the amount of work that the demon can extract from the sys-
tem. The demon can’t win, however, because the entropy reduction, averaged over the
possible results of the observation, is equal to the amount of information acquired from
the observation; hence the erasure cost of the acquired information cancels the increase in
available work. Turned on its head, this line of argument shows that if the Second Law
of Thermodynamics is to be maintained against the demon’s attack, acquired informa-
tion must have a thermodynamic cost of kBT ln 2 per bit, as was first noted by Szilard
31;
Landauer25 realized that the cost is paid when the information is erased.
A demon observes the system directly. Here we contemplate something different:
making inferences about the system by observing the environment that interacts with it.
This difference is crucial for two reasons. First, when observing the environment, there is no
necessary balance between the entropy reduction and the amount of acquired information;
this permits a nontrivial comparison between the cost of acquiring the information from
the environment and the cost of not having it. Second, by observing only the environment,
we are considering a kind of unpredictability that can be formulated in the same way in
both classical and quantum physics; this allows a meaningful comparison of classical and
quantum dynamics. Both these reasons deserve further discussion.
To discuss the first reason, it is useful to introduce the notation that we use in com-
paring costs. Averaging over the perturbing environment causes the system’s entropy to
increase by an amount ∆H0. By observing the environment, one can make the system’s
entropy increase smaller. We let ∆I be the amount of information acquired from the
observation, and we let ∆H ≤ ∆H0 be the corresponding entropy increase of the sys-
tem, averaged over the possible results of the observation. The reduction in the system’s
entropy as a consequence of the observation is ∆H0 − ∆H. The acquired information,
which has a thermodynamic cost of ∆I kBT ln 2, buys an increase in available work of
(∆H0 −∆H)kBT ln 2. Because entropy and acquired information weigh the same in the
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balance of thermodynamic cost, we can compare directly the cost of acquiring the informa-
tion with the benefit of having it just by comparing the amount of acquired information,
∆I, with the entropy reduction it purchases, ∆H0 −∆H.
If one doesn’t observe the environment, one acquires no information, i.e., ∆I = 0, and
the entropy reduction is zero, i.e., ∆H = ∆H0. A very coarse observation of the environ-
ment gathers very little information and yields very little entropy reduction. The entropy
reduction can be made progressively larger by making progressively more detailed obser-
vations, which gather more and more information about the environmental perturbation.
The entropy reduction cannot exceed the information acquired, i.e.,
∆I ≥ ∆H0 −∆H (7)
—this is another expression of the Second Law—but generally the entropy reduction is
smaller, and can be much smaller, than the information acquired from the observation.
How can such an imbalance occur? Classically, the reduction in entropy that comes
from observing the environment can be pictured roughly in the following way. Averaging
over the perturbing environment yields a phase-space density—this we call the average
density—that occupies a phase-space volume bigger than the initial volume by a factor
of 2∆H0 . The observation determines a phase-space density, within the average density,
that occupies a volume smaller than the average density by a factor of 2∆H0−∆H . If
the results of the observation corresponded to a set of (equally likely) nonoverlapping
densities that fit within the average density, then, there being about 2∆H0−∆H of these
nonoverlapping densities, the information acquired from the observation would be roughly
log2(2
∆H0−∆H) = ∆H0 − ∆H. Generally, however, the results of the observation corre-
spond to overlapping densities within the average density, of which there can be many
more than the number of nonoverlapping densities. Consequently, the information ∆I can
be much larger than the entropy reduction. The discussion in the next section indicates
how a proliferation of overlapping perturbed densities arises as a consequence of chaotic
classical dynamics, the result being an exponential imbalance between information and
entropy reduction.
The same explanation for a potential imbalance between acquired information and
entropy reduction works quantum mechanically, with the average phase-space density re-
placed by an average density operator and with the nonoverlapping and overlapping den-
sities replaced by orthogonal and nonorthogonal density operators. The potential for an
imbalance in quantum mechanics arises because an observation of the environment gener-
ally determines one of a set of nonorthogonal density operators, of which many more can
contribute to the average density operator than can orthogonal density operators.
For open systems strong unpredictability can now be seen to mean that the cost of
acquiring information from the environment and thus making the fine-grained state more
predictable is much greater than the benefit of having that predictability, i.e.,
∆I ≫ ∆H0 −∆H . (8)
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We say that a system is hypersensitive to perturbation if, for the optimal way of observing
the environment, it displays this strong unpredictability for all values of ∆H. We have
used hypersensitivity to perturbation to characterize classical and quantum chaos. A
rigorous analysis21 in symbolic dynamics15 shows that classically chaotic systems display
an exponential hypersensitivity to perturbation, for which
∆I ∼ 2Kt(∆H0 −∆H) . (9)
The acquired information becomes exponentially larger than the entropy reduction, with
the exponential rate of increase given by the KS entropy of the chaotic dynamics. In the
next section we present a heuristic version of the symbolic dynamics analysis.
What allows one to compare costs directly, in a way that is intrinsic to the system,
is the connection of missing and acquired information to thermodynamics and statistical
physics. Indeed, this connection provides a statistical-physics motivation for our approach.
Why does one average over the environment and allow the entropy of a system to increase?
Usually one gives an excuse: the environment is said to be so complicated that averaging
over it is the only practical way to proceed. We reject such apologetics in favor of a direct
comparison of costs. When a system is hypersensitive to perturbation, so that the acquired
information far exceeds the entropy reduction, it is thermodynamically highly unfavorable
to try to reduce the system entropy by gathering information from the environment. The
thermodynamically advantageous course is to average over the perturbing environment,
thus allowing the system entropy to increase. Thus the strong unpredictability of classically
chaotic open systems provides a justification for the entropy increase of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics.
Return now to the second reason for considering observations of the environment.
Classically we are dealing with the ability to predict a phase-space density when a system
is disturbed by a perturbing environment; quantum mechanically we are dealing with the
ability to predict a state vector when a system is so disturbed. Thus we deal with a kind
of unpredictability that is common to classical and quantum physics.
The key to placing classical and quantum unpredictability on the same footing is to put
aside phase-space trajectories, dealing instead with phase-space densities classically and
with state vectors quantum mechanically. When the system is unperturbed, the evolution
of classical phase-space densities is governed by the Liouville equation, and the evolution of
quantum state vectors by the Schro¨dinger equation. Neither the Liouville equation nor the
Schro¨dinger equation displays sensitivity to initial conditions: the overlap of phase-space
densities is preserved by the canonical transformations of Liouville evolution, and the over-
lap of state vectors is preserved by the unitary transformations of Schro¨dinger evolution.
Moreover, there is none of the absolute unpredictability of quantum mechanics, because
we are considering deterministic Schro¨dinger evolution rather than the unpredictable re-
sults of measurements on the system. To this predictable unperturbed evolution, we add
unpredictability by including a perturbing environment, and we ask how the perturbation
degrades the ability to predict phase-space densities classically and to predict state vectors
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quantum mechanically. The source of unpredictability in both cases is the disturbance
introduced by interaction with the environment.
Before going on to our heuristic argument for classical hypersensitivity, it is important
to mention that we model the perturbing environment by adding a stochastic term to
the system Hamiltonian. Such a stochastic perturbation can be realized as a particular
kind of coupling to an environment: one couples the system to conserved quantities of an
environment; different values of the conserved quantities specify the various realizations of
the stochastic perturbation. Such a stochastic Hamiltonian is by no means the most general
kind of coupling to an environment. What is missed by the stochastic model are classical
correlation with the environment and quantum entanglement with the environment.
III. UNPREDICTABILITY AND CHAOS
We turn now to a discussion of hypersensitivity to perturbation in classically chaotic
systems. Our objective is not to give a rigorous analysis, but rather to capture the flavor
of why classically chaotic systems display exponential hypersensitivity to perturbation.
For systems that have a symbolic dynamics,15 a rigorous analysis has been given, and the
reader intent on rigor or just interested in a more thorough formulation of the problem is
referred to that analysis.21
Consider a classical Hamiltonian system, which is globally chaotic on a compact region
of phase space, the degree of chaos characterized by the KS entropyK. Recall the picture of
the system dynamics that was introduced in Section II (see Figure 1). The initial data, that
the system occupies a coarse-grained cell of volume V, correspond to an initial phase-space
density that has the uniform value V−1 over the initial cell. Under the chaotic dynamics the
initial coarse-grained cell is stretched and folded to form an increasingly intricate pattern
on phase space. The evolving pattern has the same volume V as the initial coarse-grained
cell, and the phase-space density is uniform over the evolving pattern, with value V−1.
The dynamics of the pattern can be described crudely as an exponential expansion in
half the phase-space dimensions and an exponential contraction in the other half of the
phase-space dimensions. The exponential rate of expansion or contraction in a particular
phase-space dimension is given by a typical Lyapunov exponent λ = K/D, where 2D is
the dimension of phase space. The expansion in the expanding dimensions means that the
phase-space pattern spreads over roughly (2λt)D = 2Kt coarse-grained cells at time t. The
width of the pattern in a contracting dimension is roughly 2−λtV1/2D.
We now imagine perturbing this evolution stochastically. The perturbation is modeled
as a diffusion on phase space, characterized by a diffusion constant D. Such a perturbation
is described by adding a stochastic term to the system Hamiltonian: during each small time
interval the system evolves according to its own Hamiltonian plus an additional Hamilto-
nian selected randomly from a continuous set of possible perturbing Hamiltonians. For a
particular temporal sequence of perturbing Hamiltonians—we call such a realization of the
perturbation a perturbation history—the phase-space pattern is disturbed in a particular
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way (see Figure 1). The resulting perturbed pattern is different from the unperturbed pat-
tern, but it occupies the same volume V as the unperturbed pattern, and the perturbed
phase-space density has the uniform value V−1 on the perturbed pattern.
Averaging over the possible perturbed patterns—i.e., averaging over all the perturba-
tion histories—yields an average phase-space density, as shown in Figure 1. The diffusion
“smears out” the unperturbed pattern into an average density that occupies a larger vol-
ume than the unperturbed pattern.
Formally the evolution of the phase-space density is described by a Liouville equation
that has a stochastic contribution to the Hamiltonian. Each perturbation history cor-
responds to a particular realization of the stochastic term in this Liouville equation and
yields a particular perturbed pattern. The equation that governs the evolution of the aver-
age density is obtained by averaging the stochastic Liouville equation over all perturbation
histories. The resulting evolution equation, a Fokker-Planck equation on phase space, has
a systematic term that describes the unperturbed Hamiltonian evolution and a diffusion
term that describes the perturbation. The perturbation is characterized by its strength
and by how it is correlated across phase space. Both of these aspects of the perturbation
are important for our discussion.
An important time emerges from the interplay between the unperturbed dynamics and
the diffusion. During a typical Lyapunov time λ−1, the diffusion smears out the average
density by an amount
√
D/λ in each phase-space dimension. In the expanding dimen-
sions this smearing is overwhelmed by the expansion, but in the contracting dimensions
it becomes important once the width of the unperturbed phase-space pattern becomes
comparable to the amount of diffusion in a Lyapunov time. After this time the diffusion
balances the exponential contraction of the dynamics, with the result that the average
density ceases to contract in the contracting dimensions. We say that the perturbation
becomes effective at a time given roughly by
√
D/λ ∼ 2−λteff V1/2D ⇐⇒ teff ∼
1
2λ
log2
(
λV1/D
D
)
. (10)
No matter how weak the perturbation, the exponential contraction of the chaotic dynamics
eventually renders the perturbation effective, typically within several Lyapunov times.
After the perturbation becomes effective, the average phase-space density continues
to expand exponentially in the expanding dimensions, but this expansion is no longer
balanced by contraction in the contracting dimensions. Thus the average density occupies
an exponentially increasing phase-space volume V0 ∼ 2
K(t−teff)V—i.e., a factor of 2K(t−teff )
larger than the phase-space volume occupied by the unperturbed pattern—and the entropy
of the average density increases as
∆H0 ∼ K(t− teff) for t >∼ teff . (11)
Once the perturbation becomes effective, the entropy increase ∆H0 of the average density
is determined by the KS entropy of the system dynamics, not by some property of the
perturbation. We assume for the remainder of the discussion that t >∼ teff .
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The unpredictability quantified by the entropy increase (11) has an obvious source in
the stochastic perturbation. The perturbation histories constitute an archive that can be
consulted to reduce the entropy increase. Acquiring information about the perturbation
means finding out something about which perturbation history is the actual one. Our task
is to estimate how much information ∆I about the perturbation is required to reduce the
entropy increase to ∆H ≤ ∆H0. Determining the actual perturbation history specifies a
particular perturbed pattern, which, since it occupies the same phase-space volume as the
unperturbed pattern, has the same entropy, so that the entropy increase ∆H is kept to zero.
For a diffusive perturbation, however, determining the actual perturbation history means
singling out one history from an infinite number of histories and thus requires an infinite
amount of information. We are more interested here in acquiring partial information
about the perturbation, which means determining that the actual perturbation history
lies in some class of perturbation histories. Suppose the corresponding class of perturbed
patterns, when averaged together, produces a partial density that occupies a phase-space
volume 2∆HV = 2−(∆H0−∆H)V0, so that the corresponding entropy increase is ∆H. We
must estimate how much information is required to determine that the actual perturbation
history lies in such a class.
To make such an estimate, we need to say something about how the diffusive pertur-
bation is correlated across phase space. For simplicity, let us assume that the perturbation
is well correlated across a coarse-grained cell, but is essentially uncorrelated across scales
larger than a coarse-grained cell. At any particular time, the main effect of the perturba-
tion is the diffusion during the last Lyapunov time, because the effects of the perturbation
more than a few Lyapunov times in the past are suppressed by the exponential contrac-
tion. To keep the entropy increase to ∆H, one must acquire enough information about
the perturbation histories so that the corresponding partial density occupies a phase-space
volume that is a factor of 2∆H0−∆H smaller than the volume occupied by the average
density.
Now we come to the key point. Within each coarse-grained cell occupied by the
unperturbed pattern at time t, there are 2∆H0−∆H possible “slots” for the partial density.
Since the perturbation is essentially independent from one coarse-grained cell to the next,
one must acquire enough information, in each coarse-grained cell, to determine in which
of these slots the perturbed pattern actually lies. This means acquiring ∆H0 −∆H bits
of information about the stochastic perturbation for each coarse-grained cell occupied by
the unperturbed pattern at time t. Since the unperturbed pattern spreads over about 2Kt
coarse-grained cells at time t, the total amount of information that must be acquired to
keep the entropy increase to ∆H is roughly
∆I ∼ 2Kt(∆H0 −∆H) for t >∼ teff . (12)
Equation (12) is the main result of our heuristic argument. Its content is the fol-
lowing: once the perturbation becomes effective, a classically chaotic system displays an
exponential hypersensitivity to perturbation. A simple example of the argument leading
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to Eq. (12) is worked out in the caption of Figure 1. Although Eq. (12) is derived here
from a crude, heuristic argument, it is confirmed by a rigorous analysis of systems that
have a symbolic dynamics.21
There are limits to the validity of Eq. (12). First, Eq. (12) is no longer valid for
times large enough that the partition of the unperturbed pattern begins to have more
than one piece in each coarse-grained cell, because then the perturbations of two such
pieces are correlated. Second, Eq. (12) goes bad when the allowed entropy increase ∆H
is sufficiently small—somewhere between 0 and D bits—because one is then required to
keep track of the perturbed pattern on scales finer than the width of the unperturbed
pattern. The information ∆I then counts perturbation histories as distinct if the corre-
sponding perturbed patterns differ only on scales finer than the finest scale set by the
system dynamics. As already indicated, for a diffusive perturbation ∆I becomes infinite
as ∆H goes to zero because a diffusive perturbation has an infinite number of realizations.
The result is that when ∆H is sufficiently small, the information ∆I reveals properties of
the stochastic perturbation—essentially the number of perturbation histories that differ
on very fine scales.
The flip side of the coin is that for ∆H >∼ D, the information-entropy relation (12) is,
like the entropy increase of Eq. (11), a property of the system dynamics, not a property of
the perturbation. This is evident from the fact that both the entropy increase of Eq. (11)
and the information-entropy relation of Eq. (12) are determined by the KS entropy and
are independent of the strength of the perturbation, provided the perturbation is strong
enough to become effective before the unperturbed pattern spreads over all the coarse-
grained cells.
The further entropy increase ∆H0−∆H beyond the allowed increase ∆H is a logarith-
mic measure of the number of nonoverlapping partial densities of volume 2−(∆H0−∆H)V0
that fit within the average density of volume V0. In contrast, the information ∆I is a
logarithmic measure of the much greater number of overlapping partial densities produced
by the perturbation. The proliferation of overlapping partial densities is a consequence
of the chaotic dynamics, which spreads the unperturbed pattern over an exponentially in-
creasing number of coarse-grained cells, in each of which the perturbation acts essentially
independently.
The notion of hypersensitivity to perturbation can be applied directly to quantum dy-
namics. The initial data specify a state vector that is localized on phase space. This state
vector evolves under the influence of an unperturbed dynamics and a stochastic pertur-
bation. Each perturbation history leads to a particular state vector at time t. Averaging
over the perturbation yields an average density operator that corresponds to an entropy
increase ∆H0. Computer simulations indicate that quantum systems whose classical limit
is chaotic display hypersensitivity to perturbation,22 in that the information ∆I about
the perturbation required to reduce the entropy increase to ∆H far exceeds the entropy
reduction ∆H0 −∆H.
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The mechanism for classical hypersensitivity is that the chaotic dynamics spreads the
phase-space pattern over an exponentially increasing number of phase-space cells, in each
of which the perturbation acts independently. The result is a proliferation of overlapping
perturbed phase-space patterns. Our simulations suggest a similar mechanism for quan-
tum hypersensitivity. The chaotic quantum dynamics spreads the state vector over an
exponentially increasing number of quantum phase-space cells, each of which is a state
vector localized on phase space. Since the evolution is unitary Schro¨dinger evolution, the
spreading creates a coherent superposition of these localized state vectors. The stochastic
perturbation changes amplitudes and phases within this superposition, thereby creating
a proliferation of nonorthogonal state vectors, which are distributed randomly over the
space spanned by the localized state vectors in the superposition. This proliferation of
nonorthogonal state vectors is responsible for quantum hypersensitivity.
Our computer simulations indicate that, in contrast to the classical situation, quantum
hypersensitivity can occur for a perturbation that is correlated across all of phase space.
The essential difference seems to be that quantum mechanically the perturbation can act
on the phases in the quantum superposition, a mechanism not available to a classical
perturbation. Should this speculation be correct, quantum hypersensitivity would emerge
as a distinctly quantum-mechanical phenomenon, similar to classical hypersensitivity, yet
subtly different because of quantum superposition. Indeed, one could say that in the
case of classical hypersensitivity, the perturbation generates classical information that is
stored in an ensemble of overlapping phase-space patterns, whereas in the case of quantum
hypersensitivity, the perturbation generates quantum information that is stored in an
ensemble of nonorthogonal state vectors.
Though our simulations are not sufficient to verify this mechanism for quantum hy-
persensitivity, they do suggest models that might be simple enough to elucidate the nature
of quantum hypersensitivity analytically. Such models, together with further computer
simulations, are the focus of our current work, the goal of which is to develop a deeper
understanding of the unpredictability of open quantum systems.
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FIGURE CAPTION
Figure 1. Cartoon of classically chaotic Hamiltonian dynamics. Phase space is repre-
sented as a two-dimensional square gridded into coarse-grained cells. The initial data are
that the system begins in the shaded coarse-grained cell shown in (a); these initial data
correspond to a uniform phase-space density over the shaded cell. Under chaotic Hamil-
tonian evolution, the phase-space density spreads across phase space, creating a pattern
of uniform density, shown as the central dark line in (b); the evolved pattern occupies the
same phase-space volume as the initial cell and develops structure on finer and finer scales
as the evolution proceeds. The chaotic dynamics is characterized by the Kolmogorov-Sinai
(KS) or metric entropy, denoted by K. A crude picture is that the evolved pattern spreads
over 2Kt coarse-grained cells at time t. To analyze hypersensitivity to perturbation, we
assume that the evolution is perturbed stochastically by a diffusive perturbation that is
essentially independent from one coarse-grained cell to the next. A typical perturbed pat-
tern is shown in (b) as the dashed line that is twined about the unperturbed pattern. The
average density, shown as the shaded region in (b), is obtained by averaging over all the
perturbed patterns. In this example the average density occupies a phase-space volume
that is about four times as large as the volume occupied by the unperturbed pattern,
corresponding to an entropy increase of ∆H0 ∼ log2 4 = 2 bits. To reduce the entropy
increase to ∆H = 1 bit, one must answer the following question: in each coarse-grained
cell, on which side of the unperturbed pattern does the perturbed pattern lie? Answering
this question requires giving ∆H0−∆H ∼ 1 bit of information for each coarse-grained cell
occupied by the unperturbed pattern and thus requires a total amount of information given
by
∆I ∼ 2Kt(∆H0 −∆H) ∼ 2
Kt bits.
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